The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of pollution on the structure of cities. We base our analysis on the paper of Ogawa and Fujita (1982) , which offers a proper theoretical framework of non-monocentric urban land use using static microeconomic theory. We show that households internalize the effects of industrial air pollution in their choice of localization, which consequently reinforces spatialization within the city. We demonstrate that it impacts directly the emissions of pollution by commuting and we analyze policy instruments in order to achieve optimal land use pattern.
Introduction
In a world were distance is almost eliminated by innovations in telecommunication, people live closer and closer from each other : more than half the human population resides in urban areas (UNFPA, 2007) . Cities are the heart of any economic activities and an essential element for people's interactions. However living in city involves health risks, the World Health Organization recently highlights that air pollution lowers life expectancy by seven months for a thirty-year-old individual in Paris (Declercq et al., 2012) . In the same vein, a study conducted by the European Commission reveals that pollution is responsible for fortytwo thousand deaths per year in European cities (Watkiss et al., 2009 ). The fast expansion of cities is today correlated with an environmental concern regarding the quality of urban air.
Transport and industrial activities are two of the main sources of air pollution. Regarding CO 2 pollution in Paris region, the two sector are responsible for almost 70% of emissions. 1
Economists have been concerned with the deterioration of air quality in cities and a part of economic literature introduces air pollution in explicit spatial model. The link between environmental and spatial issue has been studied at a regional scale (Lange and Quaas, 2007; Van Marrewijk, 2005; Gaigné et al., 2012) and at a urban scale (Henderson, 1977; Robson, 1976) . We choose to study here the effect of air pollution at a urban level, that is why we will focus on the literature studying the internal structure of cities where industry and households compete for scarce land to locate.The study of pollution caused by industry composes one part of economics studies, while an other is related to the study of pollution caused by transport. Henderson (1977) is the first to study air pollution caused by industrial sources in a monocentric setting. Arnott et al. (2008) and Kyriakopoulou and Xepapadeas (2011) extend the study of industrial pollution to non-monocentric cities. In both papers all possible location combinations of housing and industry are considered. They consider a constant return to scale production function, in order to identify only the effect of pollution on agent's choice of localization and they don't take into account the agglomeration externalities existing among firms. Howewer, Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) demonstrate the importance of this externalities in the resulting equilibrium land use pattern : the existence of agglomeration economies justifies the monocentric city pattern. The introduction of environmental externalities in a model with agglomerations economies can change the well-known monocentric city result (Kyriakopoulou and Xepapadeas, 2013) . Moreover, regarding policy purposes, the pursuit of environmental goals may sometimes stimulate agglomeration economies whereas one would have expected the reverse in a non-spatial setting (Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2002) . The important result shared by all the papers previously cited studying industrial externalities is the existence of defensive behavior by households : as they dislike pollution, households choose to locate farther from polluting firms. Problems can arise when there is an excessive defensive behavior by households : the tendency to choose a more remote location entails for example larger travel cost and increased car use. The use of cars as a means of transportation 1 see http://www.airparif.asso.fr/pollution/air-et-climat is also directly responsible for emissions of pollution in cities.
As transport is one a the major source of CO 2 emissions, economists have studied the effect of car use in cities. The equilibrium land use pattern is distorted from optimum because of transport pollution (Robson, 1976) . Then policy instruments, such as a tax on commuting, should be implemented to decentralize optimum, (McConnell and Malhon, 1982; Robson, 1976; Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2003; Le Boennec, 2012) . A tax on commuting rises the transport cost borne by households and increases its centripetal effect. At equilibrium, the city is more concentrated and the level of pollution caused by cars is lower.
To the best of our knowledge, interactions between industrial pollution and transport pollution have not been explicitly examined yet in the economic literature. However the study of these two types of pollution may lead to conflicting results. Indeed air pollution resulting from industry's emissions affect the locational decision of households by pushing them away from polluting firms, while an optimal policy instrument in the case of pollution from commuting leads to more concentrated cities. If we take into account both types of pollution into a same model the conclusion may likely be different and the effect of a tax on transport may be in contradiction with the defensive behavior by households of industrial pollution. The goal of this paper is to extend the study of environmental issues into urban economics models by studying the interaction of two types of environmental externalities.
We want to assess the impact air pollution on the city structure and to analyze the inverse connection : the impact of the city structure on air quality and the use of space as a mean to control pollution. This paper also extends the literature on possible conflicting policy goals inside cities (Viguié and Hallegatte, 2012; McEvoy et al., 2006) . The objectives of this paper is then : (i) to identity the effect of industry pollution on household choice of localization when neither employment nor residential location are specified a priori, (ii) to assess the level of transport pollution resulting from the equilibrium city structure, (iii) and to find the optimal policy mix to manage both industrial and transport pollutions. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model, based on Ogawa and Fujita (1982) model of linear city with endogenous center. Section 3 deals with the equilibrium land use pattern, and section 4 focuses on the possibility of an optimal policy mix, composed of a tax on emissions paid by firms and a tax on commuting paid by households. Section 5 concludes.
Structure of the model
A linear city lies on a uni-dimensional space X =] − ∞, +∞[. In each location x ∈ X, the quantity of available land is equal to one. Two types of agents interact inside the city : firms and households. Each household provides one unit of labor to one firm, and receives a wage in exchange. Firms produce a good using a polluting technology and export it outside the city. Households consume a good z imported from outside and are affected by firms' pollution. In addition, both types of agents compete for land, owned by absentee landowners, either for residential or production purposes. These interactions take place through labor and land markets, both of which are assumed to be perfectly competitive in each point x ∈ X of the city. There is no market for pollution, firms undertake actions which have a cost for households without monetary compensation : pollution is a negative externality.
Households
We assume that there are N identical households in the city, where N is exogenously determined. We focus on a closed-city model, useful to study the internal structure of cities.
All households have identical preferences and get utility from the consumptions of a composite good Z, land S h , and perceived environmental quality E. For simplicity, the amount of land consumed by each household, S h , is assumed to be given exogenously. We choose a quasi-linear functional form to describe households' utility:
Households choose a residential location and a job site to maximize their utility under a budget constraint. Each household provides one unit of labor to a business firm located in x w and earns a wage W (x w ). This wage is used to pay a land rent R(x), and to consume composite commodity. The composite commodity is chosen as a numéraire so price p z = 1.
Environmental quality may be considered as a spatial attribute of housing, which directly enters the households' utility function but not explicitly its budget constraint. Each household commutes to the firm everyday at a cost t per kilometer travelled between residential location x and job site x w . Since all households are assumed to be identical, in equilibrium they must all achieve the same maximum utility level, independent of location. The common maximum utility level, called the equilibrium utility and denoted U * , is the solution of the following
In order to avoid unnecessary intricate analytic computation, we choose to define environmental quality as a linear function 2 . The environmental quality function is defined at each point x by :
Where b(y) is the density function of firms at location y, |x − y| is the distance between households located at x and firms located at y, ε represents the quantity of pollution emitted by one firm and η is a measure of dispersion of pollution into the atmosphere. Household located in x suffer from a negative effect of pollution emitted by firms located at y. As 2 The choice of a linear function allows us to analytically compute in a comprehensible manner the following results. Until a given point, similar results can be found using exponential functional form.
emissions disperse into the atmosphere at a constant rate, households can choose to benefit from a better environmental quality if they locate far away from firms. However, by choosing a location farther from firms, households will bear a higher transport cost. Transport cost acts as a centripetal force, while pollution acts as a centrifugal one. Households' well-being is determined by the trade-off between the accessibility to work place and the amount of environmental quality. This trade-off appears in the bid-rent function of households, which is a generalized form of the bid rent function originally defined by (Alonso, 1964) in the context of a monocentric city. The individual bid-rent function of an household located at x gives the highest price that he is willing to pay for one unit of land at x while deriving the utility level U * and given the wage profile W (x w ). It is expressed as follows
Where Z * (S h , E(x), U * ) is the solution to U (Z(x), S h , E(x)) = U * and represents the amount of composite good necessary to achieve equilibrium utility level U * when lot size is equal to S h and environmental quality to E(x). With the specified utility function defined in (2.1) we obtain:
Note that here, each household locating at x optimally chooses its job site x w , considering the trade-off between commuting cost t|x − x w | and wage W (x w ). (Ogawa and Fujita, 1980) prove that a first property of any equilibrium is no cross-commuting. Using this property they show that if commuting takes place in the equilibrium city, the equilibrium wage profile must be a linear function of distance to the center. Proof of these two propositions can be found in (Ogawa and Fujita, 1982) 3 . The equilibrium wage profile is given by :
Then, using (2.3) we conclude that at equilibrium the bid-rent function of households is written :
The bid-rent of households depends positively on wage and on environmental quality, but negatively on transport cost, revealing the trade-off between accessibility and environmental quality.
Business firms
We suppose that there are M identical firms. Each firm produces one good using land and labor, and a polluting technology that allows to reduce production costs. Production output is exported from the city at price 1. Following (Ogawa and Fujita, 1982) , we assume that the amounts of land and labor used for production by each firm are fixed. The amount of land is denoted S b and the amount of labor is L b . We assume that there is no unemployment in the city. Then at equilibrium we have the following relation :
Firms benefit from agglomeration economies, measured by the locational potential function
Where b(y) is density of business firm at y, and |x − y| is distance between firms locating at x and firms locating at y. Each firm wants to maximize profit and solves the following program
Where ε represents cost saved by using a polluting technology. We assume that the total cost saved is equivalent to the amount of pollution emissions, and that it is fixed for each firm. From the maximization problem we can define the bid-rent function of firms. It is the maximum land rent that a business firm is willing to pay to locate at x while deriving a profit π * and given the distribution of firms b(x). It is written as follows
Markets are perfectly competitive then profit is driven to zero at equilibrium, so the bid-rent function is rewritten as
The bid rend function of firms depends positively on the locational potential and on costs saved thanks to polluting technology, but negatively on wage.
Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium land use describes a state of the urban system that shows no propensity to change. It implies that there are no utility to gain by changing location, neither for firms or for households. At equilibrium, land is allocated to the highest bidder. Beyond the city's limit, there is only agricultural land, and the agricultural rent is exogenous and given by R a .
Each equilibrium spatial structure of the city is described by a system where the unknowns are the household density function h(x), the firm density function b(x), the land rent profile R(x), the wage profile W (x), the commuting pattern P (x, x w ), and the utility level U * , with
number of household locating at x and commuting to job site xw total number h(x) of household locating at x
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the system to be an equilibrium land use pattern are summarized as follows :
(i) Land market equilibrium conditions at each x :
(iii) Total unit number constraints :
3 Equilibrium land use pattern
In this section we examine each urban configuration and the conditions under which they are the equilibrium market outcome, given the fact that households internalize pollution caused by industries in their choice of localization. We also analyze the total travelled distance in each urban configuration, to understand the intensity of car pollution in each case : we assume an asymmetric perception of pollution by households since they do not account for car-related emissions. We look at how boss issues can be managed by a policy maker in section 4.
Monocentric urban configuration
We start with the basic monocentric configuration, which corresponds to a city where the majority of households leaves in suburbs while firms occupy the center. Formally, we assume that the origin is the center of the city. All firms are located around 0 between -f 1 and f 1 .
We call this section the business district (BD). Households are located in two zones, between -f 1 and -f 2 and f 1 and f 2 . We call these sections the residential areas (RA). Beyond urban fringes -f 2 and f 2 there are only agricultural lands. We assume that the city is perfectly symmetric, then it is sufficient to examine the equilibrium conditions on the right-half of the city, where x ≥ 0. We have the following density functions:
Thanks to the total unit number constraints and the full employment assumptions, we can derive the center boundary f 1 and the urban fringe f 2 as follow :
To define environmental quality in the monocentric configuration, we use equation (2.2) and equations of business density. We obtain the following environmental quality function :
Environmental quality perceived by household located in x is inversely correlated with the aggregation of pollution emitted by firms in the city, given by εM . However it increases with the distance to the center because pollution disperses into the atmosphere at rate η. E(x) is increasing and convex with x on BD and increasing and linear on RA.
The potential location function acts as a centripetal force for firms, and using definition (2.5),
we obtain F (x) in the monocentric city :
F (x) is decreasing and concave with x on BD and decreasing and linear on RA, meaning that agglomeration externalities are stronger when firms are close to each other.
The total distance travelled in a monocentric configuration is given by the aggregation of each household's ride. Formally, it is given by the following function :
Using the definition of the commuting pattern P (x, x w ), we rewrite it as follows :
Plugging this expression into (3.3), we obtain the following measure of the total distance travelled :
The property of no cross-commuting allows us to rewrite the equilibrium conditions in the land market as follows :
Where Ψ * (x) and Φ * (x) are given respectively by equation (2.4) and (2.6). Equation (3.4d) must be satisfied, which implies that the household bid-rent function must be a decreasing function of x. Then it implies :
Conditions (3.5b) means that the cost of one more unit of distance travelled, measured by the transport cost t, must be greater than the benefit of this additional unit travelled, measured by the variation of environmental quality E (x). If the marginal benefit is greater than the marginal cost, household have an incentive to locate farther from the center and the bidrent function is increasing, which cannot lead to any spatial equilibrium. Hence, if (3.5b) is satisfied Ψ * (x) is a decreasing and concave function of x. We know that Φ * (x) is also always decreasing and concave because of the functional form of F (x). Then equilibrium conditions on the land market can be rewritten as follow :
Which implies
Using equations (2.4) and (2.6), we can rewrite (3.6) and (3.7) as follows :
Parts A and A 1 correspond to the conditions derived in (Ogawa and Fujita, 1982) when there is no environmental externality. Part B and B 1 appear with the introduction of pollution in the model. They are positive constants, which means that the condition on t is easier to sustain. The presence of environmental externalities pushes households to locate farther from the business district, and leads to more spatialisation of activities.
Using equation the functional form of E(x) and F (x) given by (3.1) and (4.1), we obtain only one conditions on t :
Proposition 1 : With the presence of a negative environmental externality caused by industrial pollution, the monocentric configuration is more likely an equilibrium.
Completely mixed urban configuration
Now we analyze a situation where households and firms coexist at every point x in the city.
Therefore, households' residential location and job site are the same implying x = x w , so there is no commuting . (This type of configuration may be considered as analogous to a high densified city in a model with endogenous lot size. Indeed firms and households are close to each other and both types of configuration present the same characteristics.)
The limit of the city is given by the frontiers −f 1 and f 1 . Their is only one zone between these two limits called the integrated district (ID). As there is no commuting, the equilibrium condition in the labor market is satisfied, and the total distance travelled is equal to zero.
Under this configuration, the density function of firms and households are :
We focus again only on the right hand side of the city where x ≥ 0. Environmental quality perceived by households located at x is given by :
Environmental quality is always increasing and convex inside ID. The locational potential function is expressed as follow :
The locational potential function is decreasing and concave inside ID.
In the land market the equilibrium conditions are written:
From (2.4), (2.6) and (3.12a) we obtain the wage profile on the integrated district :
Part C is due to the introduction of environmental externalities in the model. Wage is decreasing with environmental quality. In this configuration households cannot internalize the pollution damage by choosing a location farther from firms, so firms must offer a higher wage to provide an incentive to households to locate where environmental quality is low.
Plugging (3.13) into (2.4) or (2.6), we obtain the equilibrium land rent :
Again, the rent function is increasing with the level of environmental quality, and environmental quality is an increasing function of distance. The existence of an equilibrium implies that the bid-rent function must be decreasing with x in order to satisfy condition (3.12b).
Then the following condition must hold :
The firm's loss caused by one additional unit of distance, which is represented by the variation in locational potential, must be higher than the benefit of this additional unit of distance for household, measured by the variation of environmental quality. If the benefit is higher than the loss, bid-rent function is increasing and there is no feasible equilibrium. We should notice here that if condition (3.15d) is satisfied, the absolute value of the second-derivative of F (x) is greater than the second-derivative of E(x). As F (x) is convex and E(x) is concave, the bid-rent R(x) is a concave function on ID. Moreover, W (x) is positively correlated with F (x) and negatively correlated with E(x). It implies that the wage W (x) is a strictly concave function of x. As there is no commuting in the completely mixed configuration, households have no incentive to change their job site only if |W (x)| ≤ t. This condition is equivalent to W (f 1 ) ≥ −t because of the strict concavity of W (x). Then, from this condition and with equations (3.10) and (3.11) we obtain :
Part A 2 is the condition without pollution as in (Ogawa and Fujita, 1982) . Part B 2 is due to the introduction of pollution in the model. B 2 is a positive constant meaning that the condition on t is stronger. Even if the locational potential τ is very low, the completely mixed urban configuration might not be an equilibrium because of the presence of a negative environmental externality, which pushes households far from polluting firms.
Proposition 2 : With the presence of a negative environmental externality caused by industrial pollution, the completely mixed urban configuration is less likely an equilibrium.
Incompletely mixed urban configuration
An incompletely mixed urban configuration is a generalization of the monocentric and the completely mixed configuration. This type of configuration is representative of a certain number of French agglomerations : a part of households lives in the city center where firms are also established, while an other part lives in suburbs (trouver ref). There are three sections in the city. As the city is perfectly symmetric we focus only on the right hand side. Between 0 and f 1, firms and households are mixed in the integrated district (ID). Between f 1 and f 2 , there are only firms, and it is the business district (BD). Between f 2 and f 3 , there are only households in the residential area (RA). The city boundaries are given by :
It is easy to see that the incompletely mixed urban configuration tends to be a monocentric configuration as f 1 tends to zero, and it tends to be a completely mixed configuration as f 1
Each segment of the city is characterized by the following functions:
• In the integrated district :
• In the business district :
• In the residential area :
The total distance travelled is given by the following function :
Following the same reasoning as in section (3.1), the commuting pattern is written :
Then using this expression into (3.17) gives the total distance travelled in the incompletely mixed configuration :
The equilibrium conditions in the land market for the incompletely mixed urban configuration are summarized, for x ≥ 0 as follow :
Where Ψ * (x) and Φ * (x) are given by (2.4) and (2.6) respectively. As in the case of a completely mixed urban configuration, from (2.4), (2.6) and (3.19a), we obtain the wage profile W (x) in the integrated district. On the residential area, the wage profile is a linear function of distance. To summarize, the wage profile in the city is given by :
Using (2.4) and the second part of (3.20), we can compute the value of W (x) at f 1 depending on the level of equilibrium utility U * . Knowing that this value of W (f 1 ) must be equal to the value in the first part of (3.20), we can determine the equilibrium utility level U * as a function of f 1 and f 3 :
The functional form of F (x) and E(x) allow us to say that F (x) is strictly concave on BD and linear on RA and E(x) is convex on BD and linear on RA. Using condition (3.15d), we conclude that R(x) will be concave on BD and linear on RA, so the rest of the land market conditions are equivalent to :
From these two conditions we derive :
(3.22b)
Parts B 3 and B 4 are positive constants capturing the effect of an environmental externality on the equilibrium outcome. Finally, no commuting in ID implies again that |W (x)| ≤ t for x ∈ ID, which is equivalent to the following conditions :
So when there is an environmental externality, a higher value of t is needed to sustain an incompletely mixed land use pattern at equilibrium.
Plugging definitions of F (x) and E(x) into (3.22a), we obtain the following condition :
We can now compute the value of the limit of the integrated district, f 1 . Doing so, we have a better view of the difference in urban structure with and without pollution. A large f 1 means that the city is more integrated, while a low f 1 means a more spatialiazed city. We obtain the following results :f
Wheref 1 corresponds to the limit in the no pollution case, and f 1 to the limit in the case with pollution. It is clear that f 1 <f 1 meaning that with pollution the integrated district is smaller than without pollution. Then, spatialization of activities tends to be more important with negative environmental externalities. At equilibrium land use pattern will be less integrated and more spatialized.
Proposition 3 : With the presence of a negative environmental externality caused by industrial pollution, the integrated district of an incompletely mixed city is smaller, while the business district and the residential area are larger at equilibrium.
Using equation (3.25b) into (3.22b) and (3.23) we obtain the following necessary conditions for the incompletely mixed land use pattern to be an equilibrium :
The comparison between the original analysis of (Ogawa and Fujita, 1982) and our analysis with environmental externality is summarized in Figure 4 . It appears that the domain of t in which the monocentric configuration is an equilibrium is greater with the presence of industrial pollution. This result underlines the defensive behavior of households. This defensive behavior may be a problem because the distance travelled is larger in a monocentric configuration compare to an incompletely mixed case. Indeed, plugging the definition of f 1 , f 2 and f 3 in equation (3.1) and (3.3), we can easily compare the total distance travelled in each case. The
is given by :
Equation (3.23) allows to say that this expression always ranges from 0 to 1. The total distance travelled in the monocentric case is always larger than the total distance travelled in the incompletely mixed configuration. The externality related to air pollution created by commuting is then larger because of the defensive behavior of households who locate farther from firms. 
Policy issues
The presence of externalities leads to non-optimal equilibrium land use. When they maximize profits firms do not take into account households' disutility caused by their emissions of industrial pollution, and the defensive behavior of households is responsible for an increase in car use, hence in air pollution. Indeed we have shown that industrial pollution has an impact on the structure of the city : it pushes household farther from firms and leads to a more spatialized city. The structure of the city also impacts directly the level of pollution : if we focus on the incompletely mixed urban configuration, the reduction of the integrated district conducts to a higher number of households in the residential area. They commute every day to work in the business district, increasing cars' emissions and lowering air quality. The positive externality of agglomeration economies also causes distortion from optimal land use pattern. The achievement a first-best policy requires that the number of instruments equals the number of externalities. In our model, there are three externalities : the first one is due to emission of pollution by industry, the second one is due to car pollution, and the the third is a positive externality of agglomeration economics. We do not study instruments correcting the later in this paper because our focus is on environmental externalities. Moreover, the practical implementation of first-best policy may be too complex and may require too much cooperation between different governmental authorities (Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2003) . We therefore make the hypothesis that the social planner cannot use first-best instruments, and we will consider second-best policies. The social planner which has as an objective to control air quality decides to implement a tax on commuting and a tax on firms emissions. From now on we will consider only the case of incompletely mixed urban configuration in order to have a global view of the impact of taxes on pollution externalities and on the urban structure.
Again, we also consider only the right hand side of the city where x ≥ 0.
Designing instruments
As commuting is a non-point source of pollution, it requires a lot of information for the social planner to implement a spatialized tax. On the contrary, industry emissions are fixed source of pollution, and the social planner can implement a spatialized tax on emissions, which depends on the level of pollution at each point of the city.
The tax on commuting, denoted T , is then fixed and proportional to the distance travelled by each household.
The tax on firms' emissions depends on the ambient level of pollution at each spatial point
x. The emissions' tax have the following expression :
Deriving this expression for each segment of the city, the emissions' tax is written :
Where the limit of the integrated district f t 1 = f 1 (T, θ) and the limit of the business district f t 2 = f 2 (T, θ) are endogenously determined and functions of the taxes T and θ.
Taxes and equilibrium land use pattern
The tax on commuting impacts directly the budget constraint of households. It changes the utility maximization program of households and conducts to new bid-rent functions. Following the same reasoning as in section 2 and denoting the unitary tax T with T ≥ 0, the new bid-rent function of households is written as follows :
The tax on firms' emission impacts directly the profit function of firms. They must take into account the decrease in profit due to the introduction of the tax in their localization choice and in the bid-rend function. The new bid-rent function of firms is given by :
Households located in the residential area have to pay a higher cost to commute to their job site because of the introduction of the tax. Then when they choose optimally job sites x w they consider the trade-off between commuting cost which is now (t + T )(x − x w ) and wage W (x w ).
Equilibrium wage is impacted by the increase in transport cost, and also by the increase in firms' cost due to tax on emissions. Firms offer lower wages because a part of their profit is allocated to the payment of the tax. The new equilibrium wage profile is :
Following the same reasoning as in section 2.3 we can determine the new equilibrium utility level, denoted U * T and equal to :
The utility level decreases because of the introduction of both taxes. The commuting tax increases the cost of household located in RA, and forces a part of household to relocate inside ID and to suffer from a lower environmental quality. The tax on emissions have a negative impact on wages, which lower disposable income of households. These effect involve a decrease in utility.
Using the same arguments as in section 2.3, we know that the land market conditions are equivalent to :
From these two conditions and with the new expression of Ψ * (x) we derive :
The third conditions is given by the fact that no commuting in ID implies that |W (x)| ≤ t+T for x ∈ ID, which is equivalent to :
We see that the right-hand side of equations (4.4a), (4.4b) and (4.5) are equivalent to those of equations (3.22a), (3.22b), and (3.23). Only the left-hand sides of these equation are modified, meaning that the total cost of transportation, which is the addition of the transport cost and the commuting tax, should now be taken into account. Plugging definitions of F (x) and Eq(x) into (3.22a), we obtain the following condition :
Thanks to the previous result we can compute the limit of the integrated district when taxes are implemented. We obtain the following results :
Comparing (3.25b) and (4.7) highlights the following result : the implementation of a commuting tax entails an increase in the size of the integrated district, with the apparition of T in the nominator of f 1 . In contradiction, the implementation of a tax on firms' emissions leads to a decrease in the size of the integrated district, with the apparition of the positive term θηS h in the denominator of the first term of f 1 . Both instruments have conflicting effects on the city structure.
Taxes and pollution damages
Pollution by commuting supposes that the whole society will suffer from an environmental damage. Households located in each point x of the city generate pollution by commuting to job site x w .The environmental damage created by commuting is then proportional to the total distance travelled in the city. If k is the unitary measure of pollution by commuting, the total environmental damage created by cars' emissions, denoted TDC, is :
The second source of pollution, coming from industry, is partly internalized in households preferences, as they decide to locate farther from polluting firms. However, each household only internalizes the damage created by industrial pollution at its own location, whereas pollution emitted by one firm has an impact on the whole city. Then the social cost of industrial pollution is greater than the individual cost. The total damage created by firms' pollution, denoted T DF , is the aggregation of individual damage at each point x ( x ≥ 0) of the city. It is written as follows :
Simplifying this equation, we get the following expression :
Variation of industrial damage with taxes
We have shown that the limit of the integrated district f t 1 increases with a tax on commuting and decreases with a tax on firms' emissions. In the expression of damages, only f 1 depends on the level of taxes T and θ. Then we now analyze the variation of the industrial damages with respect to f t 1 in order to show how this damage varies with each tax. The first derivative of the industrial damage with respect to f 1 is given by :
This expression is always strictly positive. Then an increase in the size of f t 1 leads to an increase in damage created by industrial pollution. Indeed, a larger number of households will suffer directly from firms' pollution.
A tax on firms' emissions reduces the size of f t 1 , then it decreases the damage created by industrial pollution. On the contrary, a tax on commuting rises the size of f t 1 , then it increases the damage created by industrial pollution.
Variation of commuting damage with taxes
Following the same reasoning, we analyze the variation of the damage created by commuting with respect to each tax. The first derivative of the industrial damage with respect to f t 1 is given by :
∂T DC ∂f t
This expression is always negative. Then an increase in the size of f t 1 leads to a reduction in damage created by commuting. Indeed, a lower number of households will have to commute to work every day.
A tax on commuting enlarges the size of f t 1 , then it decreases the damage created by commuting. On the contrary, a tax on firms' emissions decreases the size of f t 1 , then it increases the damage created by commuting.
This results suggests that both types of policy instruments may have conflicting effect and it may not be appropriate to use both simultaneously. A deeper study of the variation of social welfare with respect to both taxes is now under way to obtain more advanced results.
Conclusion
We develop a model of city in which firms and households are free to chose were to locate. The structure of the city is nonuniform firstly because of agglomeration economies, as in (Ogawa and Fujita, 1982) . They show that monocentric configuration arises only under special circumstances : when transport cost is relatively small and/or the transaction rate between firms is high. Our intention was to study wether the consideration of environmental issues can change this conclusion. Our results suggest indeed that environmental externality, under the form of industrial air pollution, reinforces the possibility of a monocentric equilibrium.
More generally, we show that point-source industrial pollution leads to more spatialized city due to the defensive behavior of households. This result is consistent with the previous literature on urban environmental externalities such as papers of (Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2003) or of (Kyriakopoulou and Xepapadeas, 2013) . We highlight the fact that defensive behavior of households causes an increase in car pollution. The interesting point here is the mutual relation between pollution and the city structure : point-source pollution impacts directly the city structure because it pushes households far from firms, while the resulting spatialized city creates more important environmental damages due to car's non-point source pollution.
The second part of our analysis consist in studying the policy issues raised by the existence of externalities. We study the impact of a second-best policy taking the form of a commuting tax and a tax on firms' emissions. Our results show that both type of taxes have contradictory effects on the city structure and on the resulting pollution damages. It underlines the contradiction between the two types of pollution : industrial pollution is less harmful when households locate far from firms, while transport pollution is stronger in that case. Thus these results suggest that the choice of an appropriate policy instrument may depend on the relative impact of each type of pollution on the environment. Our paper is a first step in the study of mutual interactions of different sources of urban environmental externalities, however it is not yet fully satisfying because of the numerous simplifying assumptions.
